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Case Notes
Bankruptcy-Corporate Reorganization-Transfer to Chapter X-Securities
and Exchange Commission v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594
(1965).
THROUGH ITS NOW-BANKRUPT AFFILIATE, Demar, Inc., respondent debtor had manu-
factured for rental purposes a fleet of small trailers of the type which hitch to the back
of automobiles. The venture was financed by selling the trailers to private investors
and, in the same transaction, leasing them back. The trailers were then placed for
rental by individual customers in 700 gasoline stations scattered throughout the west-
ern states. Over $3.5 million was realized from the sale of almost 6,000 such trailers.
In 1961 the Securities and' Exchange Commission intervened to halt further sale and
rental-back arrangements on the grounds they constituted investment contracts which
required the filing of a registration statement.' Upon respondent's filing of the state-
ment, the S.E.C. issued a stop order halting the distribution of respondent's prospec-
tus for containing "false and misleading statements." 2 At this point members of
American's management organized Capitol Leasing Corp. Capitol offered American's
investor-creditors a "swap" of about 300 shares of Capitol stock for each trailer. The
S.E.C. intervened again, suspending the registration exemption of Capitol on the
grounds that "the material used in making this offer again contained false and mis-
leading statements."3 Respondent then filed under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy
Act4 for an "arrangement" of its debt. The petition revealed that respondent's assets
stood at $685,608; $500,000 of this figure represented the value of its "rental system,"
sanguinely termed an "intangible asset."5 Contrasted with these assets were liabilities
of $1,367,890. American proposed that the investors surrender their rights to the
trailers in exchange for the issue to them of one share of Capitol stock for each $2 of
their claims against American, an offer considerably less generous than the outright
300 shares previously proposed. In addition, creditors, officers, and directors of Ameri-
can were to receive one share of Capitol stock per $3.50 of their claims. Stockholders,
2 Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §77a et seq. (1958).
2 Securities Act of 1933, §8 (d), 48 Stat. 79, 15 U.S.C. §77h (d) (1958).
8 Securities Act Release No. 4615, pursuant to Securities Act of 1933 §8 (d), 15 U.S. C. 77th
(d) (1958).
'Bankruptcy Act §301, et seq., 11 U.S.C. §701, et seq. (1958).
5Brief for Petitioner, p. 11.
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over 50% of whom were American's directors, were to receive 107,000 Capitol shares. 6
In a separate class of creditors were two banks having made loans to American guar-
anteed by American's management-they were to be immediately paid in full. The
S.E.C. intervened to transfer the Chapter XI arrangement proceeding to a Chapter X
corporate reorganization proceeding. 7 The district court, while disapproving of two
aspects of the proposal,S followed the referee and dismissed the motion. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed.9 Following a writ of certiorari10 the Supreme Court, in a unanimous
opinion written by Mr. Justice Goldberg, reversing, held: Chapter XI is not available
to respondent debtor.11
Prior to 1934, corporate reorganization was effectuated by equity receivership. Lack
of judicial supervision and consequent frequent injustices to certain classes of credi-
tors made this system generally unsatisfactory. In response, Congress provided for
judicial supervision over corporate reorganization by adding §77B to the Bankruptcy
Act.12 By separate legislation it created the Securities and Exchange Commission, em-
powering it to protect the right of the public investor.13 Four years later this legisla-
tion was supplanted by The Bankruptcy Revision of 1938, known as the "Chandler
Act."' 4 Chapters X and XI were created, the effects of which were to produce in-
creased specialization in corporate rehabilitations, and to further augment judicial
supervision and public protection in the process.
The scope of these two chapters was left largely to judicial determination. Chapter
XI is the domain of the "creditor's composition" of a corporation's debt, and, unlike
the broader scope of Chapter X, is limited to an adjustment of unsecured debts.' 5 It
is generally thought to be confined to more-or-less slight modifications of the corpo-
rate balance sheet, necessitated, for example, by a temporary overreaching of produc-
tion, an occasional lapse in liquidity, or by other problems of a similar nature. Con-
trasted with this, Chapter X is designed to effectuate a thoroughgoing fiscal change
within the corporation. 16 Here the needed adjustment is of a more serious and funda-
mental nature. Here the problem is generally not one of temporary illiquidity, but
rather one of long-range insolvency. The history of the case law in this area discloses
6 Id. at 12, 13.7 Bankruptcy Act §328, 11 U.S.C. §728 (1958).
'The United States District Court for the District of Colorado, in an unreported opinion,
recognized that, since the trailer owner-investors were widely scattered and the nature of
their individual holdings was small, the proposed plan's issuance of approximately 15% of
Capitol's stock to respondent's officers and directors would mean that they, rather than the
public investors, would have effective control over Capitol. The District Court, through
Chief Judge Arraj, also disapproved of the preferential treatment of the banks in order to
avoid the obligations of the officer and director guarantors. In the Matter of American
Trailer Rentals Company, Br. 33276. Cf. the brief of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission filed in support of the petition for a writ of certiorari, Appendix B.
325 F.2d 47 (10th Cir. 1964).
376 U.S. 948. (1964).
' Securities and Exchange Commission v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965).
'248 Stat. 911, 912 (1934).
48 Stat. 885 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §78d (1958).
1452 Stat. 840 (1938).
11 Supra note 4.
16Bankruptcy Act §101, et seq., 11 U.S.C. §501, et seq. (1958).
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a constant search for standards to be used in determining which chapter is to be em-
ployed in a given situation. The difficulty lies in resolving conflicting policies, one of
which seeks a workable rule for clarifying the boundaries of the two chapters, the
other of which seeks flexibility in an area in which an administrative, case-by-case
approach is most desirable. For the most part the second policy has dominated, with
the result that generalizations in this area can be expected to fail; the compensation
has been the growing body of case law, the natural tendency of which has been the
realization of the first goal.
In the first major case in this area, S.E.C. v. United States Realty and Improvement
Corp.,17 respondent debtor sought to modify its obligation as guarantor of a subsidi-
ary corporation's issue of debentures. The modification included a substantial de-
crease in the interest payments, extension of the date of maturity, and a modification
of the sinking fund provisions. On certiorari, the Supreme Court, reversing dismissal
below, held that a corporation is precluded from effectuating a virtual reorganization
under Chapter XI and that Chapter XI allows only for composition and extension of
debts. As both chapters contained the "fair and equitable" requirement at that time,18
the Court applied the "strict priority rule," or the "Boyd rule," of creditors over
shareholders in corporate reorganizations. 19
Legislative adjustment was made manifestly necessary. Clearly, further attempt at
applying Chapter XI would be instantly frustrated by the Boyd requirement. Rather
than specifically writing Boyd out of Chapter XI, Congress in 1952 amended the Bank-
ruptcy Act, and, with a broad sweep, deleted the "fair and equitable" requirement
from Chapter XI, leaving in its place the requirement that the plan be in the "best
interests of the creditors,...." 20 But the amendment in many respects added to the
confusion.21
1"310 U.S. 434 (1940).
18Both Chapters X, §221 (2), and XI, §366 (2), of the Chandler Act, supra note 14, in its
original form, contained the requirement that the proposed plan of reorganization be "fair
and equitable" before it could be approved by the court.
The so-called "Boyd rule" emerged in Northern Pacific Railway v Boyd, 228 U.S. 482
(1913), and was employed by the Supreme Court in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products
Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939) before its application in S.E.C. v. United States Realty and Improve-
ment Corp., supra note 17, at 452, to interpret the meaning of the phrase "fair and equit-
able":
... in any plan of reorganization, unsecured creditors are entitled to priority over stock-
holders to the full extent of their debts, and that any scaling down of the claims of the
creditors without some fair compensating advantage to them which is prior to the rights
of the stockholders is inadmissible.
"066 Stat. 420, 433 (1952), Bankruptcy Act §366(2), 11 U.S.C. §766(2) (1958). The last
paragraph in the amended section positively demonstrates Congress' intention to do away
with strict conformation with the Boyd rule as a requisite for judicial approval of a proposed
plan of reorganization under Chapter XI:
Confirmation of an arrangement shall not be refused solely because the interest of a debtor,
or if the debtor is a corporation, the interests of its stockholders or members will be pre-
served under the arrangement.
Cf. Friendly, J. in S.E.C. v. Canandaigua Enterprises Corp., 339 F.2d 14, at 18 (1964):
"However, at the same time, it added §328 relative to dismissal unless proceedings were taken
under Chapter X, stating that this 'codifies the law of the United States Realty and Improve-
ment case.' H. Rep. No. 2320, 82d Cong. 2d Sess. 19 (1952), 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1980 (1952)." Thus, Congress codified United States Realty, supra note 17, as to dismissal of
1965]
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Within three years of the amendment General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky22 reached
the Supreme Court. Petitioner, though not insolvent, was illiquid and unable to
meet currently maturing obligations, no part of which were held by the public; the
debtor petitioned for a Chapter XI extension. The apparent feasibility of the plan,
however, broke down under oral argument.20 The Commission was successful in gain-
ing transfer to Chapter X, the Court noting that the criterion was not whether the
corporation was a large or a small one, nor was it the nature of the capital structure,
but rather the more flexible rule of which "would better 'serve the public and private
interests concerned, including those of the debtor.' "24
In two circuit opinions, the motion of the Commission to transfer proceedings
from Chapter XI to Chapter X has been specifically denied. In 1954 the Second Cir-
cuit considered a debtor corporation's petition for an arrangement under Chapter
XI, In re Transvision,In., 25 which would not alter the interests of either the common
stockholders (65% of the shares management held) or the preferred stockholders (all
of the shares management held). The Commission's motion to transfer to Chapter X
was denied, the court holding that the presence of public ownership (425 public in-
vestors) was only one of the factors to be considered in such a motion, and that the
genuine criterion was the presence of a public interest requiring Chapter X protec-
tion. The Commission's test was condemned as too mechanistic, unflexible, and un-
realistic. 20
Debentures issued by the debtor corporation in S.E.C. v. Wilcox-Gay Corp.,27
were held by public investors. Respondent had petitioned for, and had been granted,
a Chapter XI composition, under which the claims of general trade creditors would
be scaled down; under the plan the rights of the debenture-holders would remain in-
tact. The Sixth Circuit upheld the plan principally because the claims of the deben-
ture-holders remained inviolate.
Within the past year, two decisions of note have been handed down from the Cir-
cuits. In S.E.C. v. Crumpton Builders, Inc., 2s respondent debtor, in "going public"
had over-extended itself in issuing $3 million in debentures. The proposed arrange-
ment would leave unchanged the rights of the stockholders, while seriously scaling
a proceeding brought under Chapter XI unless it is transferred to Chapter X when such
proceeding should have been brought under Chapter X in the first place, Bankruptcy Act
§328, 11 U.S.C. §728 (1958), simultaneously with destroying its principal rationale, by delet-
ing the requirement of "fair and equitable" from a Chapter XI proceeding.
350 U.S. 462 (1955).
1Id. at 465.
2 Id. at 465, quoting from S.E.C. v. United Realty and Improvement Corp., supra note
17, at 455.
2'217 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 952 (1955).
2 The S.E.C. has traditionally taken the position that Chapter X is required in every case
in which the corporate debtor is publicly owned or in which the rights of public investor-
creditors are involved. This type of absolute test has been repeatedly rejected by the courts
down through the years since the passage of the Chandler Act, supra note 14. The Supreme
Court in the principal case has once again disavowed such an absolute line of demarcation
between the two chapters. Cf. S.E.C. v. American Trailer Rentals Co., supra note 11, at
610-613.
21231 F.2d 859 (6th Cir. 1956).
8337 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1964).
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down the claims of these debenture-holders. The court held that, although the com-
pany was only illiquid, not completely insolvent, nonetheless, the pervasiveness of
the needed reorganization militated for Chapter X safeguards over widely scattered
public investor interests. Consciously avoiding any criterion, the court set out some-
thing of a checklist of factors to be considered. 29
Contrasted with the "checklist" approach of Judge Wisdom in Crumpton Builders,
the Second Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Friendly in S.E.C. v. Canandaigua
Enterprises Corp.,80 after noting Supreme Court disapproval of flat rules, and noting
at the same time the morass of uncertainty resulting from Congressional "delphic
language" reasoned to the next best thing to the rule, the presumption.
But we do not read that decision [General Stores] as precluding a court of appeals
from ruling that the need for a readjustment of publicly held debt creates a
presumption in favor of Chapter X, whereas a case calling only for modification
of the claims of trade creditors or others who have had private dealings with the
debtor is presumptively to be handled under Chapter XI.8'
This approach apparently has met with Supreme Court approval in the principal
case.
8 2
Applying this background to American Trailer Rentals, it appears clear that the
corporate debtor's situation called for a Chapter X remedy. The record presented
abundant evidence of palpable corporate mismanagement.8 8 One class of creditors, in
relation to which respondent's directors stood as guarantors, was given patent pref-
erence although the debt was unsecured.34 The planned issuance of stock would ul-
timately vest effective control in the same directors. Hardly a simple extension or
composition arrangement, the plan constituted a major fiscal reorganization in which
the value of the investment was severely reduced. While trailer owners "who do not
elect to participate. . . may take possession of their trailers," 35 the plan imposed, by
29Id. at 912. The arrangement should be "fair and equitable to all interests on its face,"
(arguing that, in all events, a court of Bankruptcy is a court of equity and is to be governed
by equitable principles in the application of "its analytical tools"); there should be "no
particular need for recapitalization or replacement of management"; "no indication of
managerial treachery"; "good future prospects"; "full and adequate information available"
precluding the need of an independent trustee's investigation, etc.
10339 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1964).
mId. at 19.
Citing S.E.C. v. Canandaigua Enterprises Corp., Mr. Justice Goldberg stated in the
principal opinion: ".. .as a general rule Chapter X is the appropriate proceeding for adjust-
ment of publicly held debt." Supra note 11, at 613.
1 Loss had resulted from a corporate violation of a covenant in the sale-and-lease-back
agreement that "()essee shall maintain insurance upon said trailers. .. " (clause 8 of
"Trailer Lease," supplement to the record); investors' funds had been misappropriated,
attributable "almost completely" to a deceased member of the management (Cf. testimony
of debtor's executive vice president before the Special Master, Record, p. 124, also pp. 63-64.
76-77. Contrasted with total liabilities in excess of $1.3 million were assets of less than
$700,000, $500,000 of which represented the estimated and problematic value of the trailer-
rental system, a system built at the cost of only $33,750.
" Supra note 11, at 602: ". . . obligations to two banks, totaling $55,558, although clearly
unsecured, were to be paid in full, presumably because the officers and directors of respond-
ent would otherwise have been liable as guarantors of these obligations."
3 Brief for Respondent, p. 7.
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the very nature of the far-flung system, an inherent coercion on the trailer-owner
investors.
Running throughout these opinions, particularly the present case, is the notion
that the court will take an overall look at the future prospects of the corporation to
determine whether the rehabilitation is in fact, worth the effort.
... we feel compelled to point out, without indicating any opinion as to the ulti-
mate outcome of any attempted financial rehabilitation in this case, that it must
be recognized that Chapter X and XI were not designed to prolong-without
good reason and at the expense of the investing public-the corporate life of
every debtor suffering from terminal financial ills.36
The courts, as did the Supreme Court in the principal case, appear to indulge in a
subconscious, unarticulated value judgment as to the underlying realities of the cor-
porate balance sheet. Perhaps with justification they divine for omens as to the prac-
ticality of continuing corporate existence. Perhaps present is an underlying rationale
designed at protecting the public investor from himself in a situation in which further
transfusions of liquidity appear likely to be exercises in futility.
I Supra note 11, at 618. But for the opposite side of the coin, see COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
vol. 8, 4.22 (2) Practical Application of §328.
Constitutional Law-Due Process: Right to Counsel-Juvenile Court Pro-
ceedings-Waiver of Jurisdiction-Kent v. United States, -U.S. App. D.C.-.
-F. 2d- (1964).
PETITIONER MoRRis A. KENT, JR., was sixteen years old at the time of his arrest on sus-
picion of robbery, housebreaking and rape. He previously had been a probationer of
the juvenile court, subject to its care for two years. He was arrested, in connection
with the instant case, at about 3:00 p.m. on September 5, 1961. He was taken to police
headquarters, instead of the Juvenile Court or the Receiving Home for Children as
required by law,' and kept there until 10:00 p.m., being interrogated by police offi-
cers acting in relays. That night he was brought to the Receiving Home for Children
and placed in solitary confinement. Early the next morning the Receiving Home re-
leased him to the police and he was again unremittingly interrogated by officers acting
in relays.
1 D.C. CODE ANN. §11-912 (1961).
[Vol. XIV
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Shortly after 2:00 p.m. on September 6, 1961 his mother retained counsel who
immediately filed an objection, with the Juvenile Court, to the treatment of the boy.
He made a motion requesting that Kent's social service records be made available to
him in order that they might be evaluated. Since the charges pending against peti-
tioner involved felonies, the Juvenile Court could waive jurisdiction to the District
Court.2 Counsel therefore moved the Juvenile Court for a hearing at which he could
present his case against waiver of jurisdiction to the adult court on capital charges.
Petitioner filed affidavits of psychiatrists tending to show that he was and had been
mentally ill for a considerable period of time,3 and that his mental illness had been
neglected by the authorities of the Juvenile Court. These affidavits remained before
the court uncontroverted. The Juvenile Court failed to pass upon the objection and
the motions. Furthermore, counsel was never afforded, during any part of the pro-
ceedings, either a formal or informal appearance before the Juvenile Court.
On September 12, 1961, pursuant to the waiver provision, the Juvenile Court en-
tered an order, without any opinion or statement of reasons, waiving jurisdiction to
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Petitioner was con-
victed on three housebreaking and three robbery counts, and was sentenced to serve
5 to 15 years on each such count to run consecutively, a total of 30 to 90 years. He
was found not guilty by reason of insanity on two counts charging him with rape.
Although several errors were assigned as a basis for appeal to the Supreme Court,
4
this note is primarily concerned with the procedure for jurisdictional waiver. Title
11-912 of the District of Columbia Code confers discretionary power, without stand-
ards for its exercise, upon the Juvenile Court to waive its jurisdiction over children
of sixteen years or more.5 The only requirement is that a "full investigation" be held.6
The Juvenile Court has set up its own criteria upon which waiver is based.7 Hence,
the question immediately arises whether a child is entitled to the protection of con-
stitutional rightsS during the Juvenile proceedings, and if so, whether such protection
was denied in this case. Petitioner was not afforded an opportunity to appear with
counsel and present his case against waiver, nor is there a clear indication as to what
constitutes a "full investigation" as contemplated by the statute. It is not arguable
that waiver is a disposition unlike probation or other Juvenile Court actions. Should
different considerations be employed in the process of disposing youths to the crimi-
nal courts?
The waiver was attacked simultaneously through both a habeas corpus petition in
District Court, and a direct appeal to the then Municipal Court of Appeals, upon
'D.C. CODE ANN. §11-914 (1961). (Must be sixteen and charged with an offense which
would amount to a felony if committed by an adult.)
I One affidavit stated: "It is my professional opinion that the respondent is a victim of
severe psychopathology and that a complete investigation of the psychological and social
factors of his case is impossible without placing him in a hospital situation for psychiatric
observation."
I Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed 22 Dec. 1964 (Misc. 824).
1 Supra note 2.
6 Ibid.7Juvenile Court, Policy Memorandum No. 7, November 30, 1959. Formulated by Judge
Ketcham.8 U.S. Const. amend. V (due process); U.S. Const. amend. VI (right to counsel).
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the grounds that the Juvenile Court had deprived petitioner of due process of law,
and had not accorded him the "full investigation" which is the prerequisite to waiver.
Upon adverse decisions in both courts an appeal was taken to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,9 which held that habeas corpus was
not available inasmuch as the question could be raised in the criminal proceeding by
motion to dismiss the indictment (which motion was made and denied without allow-
ing petitioner a hearing on uncontroverted allegations as to his treatment in Juvenile
Court), and that the waiver order was not final and appealable.0 Subsequently, Kent
was tried and convicted. The conviction was appealed and affirmed by a three judge
panel.1' In discussing the parens patriae philosophy of the statutory scheme under
which the Juvenile Court functions,' 2 the court decared that, "for the system to op-
erate as intended, the Court must have a wide discretion in both the formulation and
the application of a waiver policy".' 3 In this regard the court took full note of the
Juvenile Court's Policy Memorandum No. 714 and found that its standards were not
".... arbitrary or capricious on their face .... 15 Significantly however, the court con-
tinued:
"We do not, of course, have in this record a specification by the Juvenile Court
Judge of precisely why he concluded to waive jurisdiction6 . But neither may one
infer from what is before us that his reasons fell outside the penumbra of Policy
Memorandum No. 7, or that he chose to treat this case in a manner wholly differ-
ent from that contemplated by such memorandum. Applying the same criteria-
freighted as they are with highly subjective element-we perhaps might have
reached a different result".16 (Emphasis added).
The footnote cogently remarked,
"6 No opinion accompanied the decision. Although none is required by the stat-
ute, a useful purpose might be served in some cases at least by a discussion of the
reasons motivating the determination. Unaided by such a discussion, our task
remains the one of weighing the decision in the light of what the record dis-
closes".17
On a previous occasion the Court of Appeals had an opportunity to discuss the
9Kent v. Reid, 114 U.S. App. D.C. 330, 316 F.2d 331 (1963).
"0D.C. CODE ANN. §§11-772 (a), 11-914 (1961).
1 Kent v. United States, - U.S. App. D.C.- , - F.2d- (1964) (No. 17,935).
2"The fundamental philosophy of the juvenile court laws is that a delinquent child is
to be considered and treated not as a criminal but as a person requiring care, education and
protection .... the primary function of juvenile courts.., is not conviction or punishment
for crime, but crime prevention and delinquency rehabilitation." Thomas v. United States,
74 U.S. App. D.C. 167 at 170, 121 F.2d 905 at 908 (1941).
"Kent v. United States, supra note 11, - U.S. App. D.C. at-, F.2d at-.
1" Id., - U.S. App. D.C. at - , - F.2d at - . The court lists the complete Policy
Memorandum, supra note 7.
"5 Kent v. United States, supra note 11, - U.S. App. D.C. at-, - F.2d at-.
'ld., - U.S. App. D C. at , - F.2d at -.
11 Id., - U.S. App. D.C. at , - F.2d at -.
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validity of the waiver provision'S of the Juvenile Court Act. In finding it constitu-
tional, the court explained the discretionary nature of the statute by saying, "there
are no precisely formulated criteria for the difference in result. It is an imponderable,
a true exercise of judgment."' 9 In light of this "imponderable," the court in the in-
stant case evaluated the validity of the waiver by the Juvenile Court, which was cogni-
zant of the petitioner's mental deficiency. Notwithstanding the fact that the possible
mental illness had been neglected during two years of wardship preceding the waiver,
the court did not ". . . consider that the Juvenile Court either can or must finally and
definitively resolve this issue as a precondition to a valid waiver. Waiver does not fix
criminal responsibility." 20 Although the waiver may not fix this responsibility, the
judge considered the "prosecutive merit of the complaint" 21 in making his decision.
Irrespective of the words used to describe the effect of the waiver it is in reality the
nemesis which petitioner legitimately sought to avoid.22 Concurring specially, Judge
Washington discloses that, "(i)t is a fair inference from the record before us that one
of the reasons why the Juvenile Court waived jurisdiction was because appellant was
seriously disturbed and the Juvenile Court lacked facilities adequately to treat
him1."28
The Juvenile Court judge presumably made use of petitioner's social service rec-
ord 24 in deciding to waive jurisdiction. Counsel was denied access to these same files
although the statute permits disclosure.25 In Watkins v. United States, 26 decided
three weeks subsequent to the instant case, this court held that, "Where, as here, the
child's attorney challenges waiver by the Juvenile Court, the need for confidentiality
of any parts of the social record must be compelling in order to bar disclosure. In
effect, waiver is a judicial determination that the child is beyond the rehabilitative
philosophy of the Act."27 (Footnote omitted). The question remains however: how
could counsel render effective assistance in his argument against waiver without
questioning the basis for it, and how could it be questioned without knowing what
Islnserted in the 1938 Act: Act of June 1, 1938, 52 Stat. 596.
19 Briggs v. United States, 96 U.S. App. D.C. 392 at 394, 226 F.2d 350 at 352 (1955).
10 Kent v. United States, supra note 11, - U.S. App. D.C. at - , F.2d at
2 Criterion #4 of Policy Memorandum, supra note 7, states that the court will consider,
"The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon which a
Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment (to be determined by consultation
with the United States Attorney)."
'See Shears, Legal Problems Peculiar To The Juvenile Court, 28 J.B.A. D.C. 486, 489
(1961).
1 Kent v. United States, supra note 11, - U.S. App. D.C. at F.2d at - . The
footnote refers to the Policy Memorandum, supra note 7. "The young delinquents in this
age group (15-17) differ widely. Their characteristics differ, and the causes of their difficulties
differ. I shall not talk about the youngsters who are neurotic, mentally ill or otherwise
incapacitated. They are indeed a serious problem, but it is a medical problem, a problem
of treatment, not of law enforcement." Prettyman, Three Modern Problems In Criminal
Law, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 187, 192 (1961).
24 These records are primarily reports of investigations concerning the child, including
home environment, previous history and reports about his conduct and condition while
under the juvenile court's supervision. See Watkins v. United States, - U.S. App. D.C.
-F.2d - (1964), n. 1.
0D.C. CODE ANN. §11-929 (b) (1961).
"- U.S. App. D.C. - , - F.2d - (1964) (No. 18,421).
Id., - U. S. App. D.C. at , - F.2d at -
19%5]
276 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. XIV
ought to be questioned?25 "Since an attorney has no certain knowledge of what the
social records contain, he cannot be expected to demonstrate the relevance of par-
ticular items in his request9 ." 29
Closely related to counsel's request for disclosure of the social service files was his
request for a hearing before waiver which was not granted, or even passed upon. The
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not apply in Juvenile Court proceedings,
therefore, it has been held that the hearing upon waiver may be ex parte,30 but that
"... the 'full investigation' which §11-914 requires before the Juvenile Court can
waive jurisdiction includes informal hearings as provided for in § 11-915."'31 In light
of the foregoing, the question which remains is whether the wide discretion allowed
the Juvenile Court judge results in denial of the constitutional protections afforded
by the rights of due process of law under the Fifth Amendment, and effective assist-
ance of counsel under the Sixth. 2 The procedure followed might well circumvent the
"full investigation" requirement of the statute; a condition precedent to valid waiv-
er. It is an understatement to write that there is a lack of unanimity among courts as
to whether or not any constitutional protections apply in juvenile proceedings.8 3
The argument is usually made that the proceeding is informal and non-criminal, and
thus not 'limited' by constitutional restrictions. The court stated on a previous occa-
sion that the "... constitutional safeguards vouchsafed a juvenile in such proceedings
are determined from the requirements of due process and fair treatment, and not by
the direct application of the clauses of the Constitution which in terms apply to
criminal cases." 84 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Shioutakon v. District of Columbia,35 skirted the constitutional issue of
right to counsel when it declared that "the 'right to be heard' when personal liberty is
at stake requires the effective assistance of counsel in a juvenile court quite as much
as it does in a criminal court,"8 6 but then qualified this pronouncement in a foot-
21,"Surely the information on which such a decision is taken ought to be carefully gathered
and dispassionately evaluated. The process of disposition in the juvenile court must meet
a standard of fairness, and that standard requires as a minimum that casework reports be
made available to the child's lawyer upon request." Shears, supra note 22, at 491.
"Watkins v. United States, supra note 24, - U.S. App. D.C. at - , - F.2d at
Interestingly, the footnote refers to the instant case and makes an attempt to distinguish it
upon the narrow grounds ". . . that the requested records were not relevant to the attorney's
essential purpose in requesting disclosure," which was to have them examined by psychiatric
experts.
8 United States v. Stevenson, 170 F. Supp. 315 (D.D.C. 1959). Nor is counsel required.
United States v. Dickerson, 106 U.S. App. D.C. 221,225, 271 F.2d 487, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
2 "But an infant in court is entitled to fair-play; he is, in other words, entitled as of right
to due process of law. The point at this stage is that the due process to which an infant is
entitled is a process suitable to his status and his substantive rights. It is not the due process
to which an adult is entitled. . . . The sum of it is that juveniles have particular and
peculiar legal rights, and they require particular and peculiar treatment." Prettyman, supra
note 23, at 199.
"Annot., 151 A.L.R. 1229 (1944); In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955); See also
Beemsterboer, The Juvenile Court-Benevolence In The Star Chamber, 50 J. CRIM. L., C.
& P.S. 464 (1960).
' Pee v. United States, 107 U.S. App. D.C. 47, 50, 274 F.2d 556 at 559 (1959).
'98 U.S. App. D.C. 371, 236 F.2d 666 (1956).
,8 Id., 98 U.S. App. D.C. at 374, 236 F.2d at 669.
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note37 where it added, "... we do not reach consideration of due process require-
ments since our holding rests on our view of the statute."
Upon decision of the Watkins case supra, which followed the expiration of time for
rehearing in the instant case, Kent's counsel moved for leave to file out of time a peti-
tion for rehearing en banc. The motion was not acted upon for some time, and he
then moved to withdraw his original motion in order to petition the Supreme Court
for certiorari.38 This latter motion was granted on January 22, 1965.39 However, in
extraordinary fashion Chief Judge Bazelon, joined by Judge Wright, dissented, in-
dicating he would have desired the rehearing en banc. The language of the dissent is
lucid and poignant:
I think it shocking that a child was subjected to prosecution and punishment as
a criminal because he was thought to suffer from a serious mental or emotional
disturbance. I can think of no stronger reason for not doing this.... When this
court affirmed appellant's conviction, a majority took the position that it did not
know why the Juvenile Court had waived jurisdiction ... but would trust to 'the
skill and experience of the specialist judge. . . .' Accordingly this court made no
use of its statutory authority to review the "social records" of the Juvenile
Court.... In effect, this court set up an irrebuttable presumption that a waiver
of jurisdiction ... is proper. This conflicts with the Juvenile Court Act, with our
previous opinions, and with the court's observation in this very case that waivers
must not be "arbitrary or capricious".... There can be no intelligent review of
the ... waiver ... unless the reasons for it are stated on the record. Without the
benefit of such statement, the child's counsel is duty-bound to pursue by inquiry
and challenge every matter conceivably affecting the waiver decision in order to
make a record for review. 40 (Emphasis by the Court. Footnotes omitted).
The Juvenile Court standards in the District of Columbia are not well defined. There
are many diverse opinions within the American judicial establishment. 41 The central
issue is to what extent traditional constitutional guarantees apply to juvenile court
proceedings. The District of Columbia courts have not recognized the right of a child
to a preliminary hearing of any kind before waiver. The necessary result is that upon
appeal counsel and court alike are left to conjecture as to what transpired in the mind
of the Juvenile Court judge in making his waiver decision. The record is void of any
substantive proceedings in the Juvenile Court. Juvenile status is unfortunately the
"conduit" through which unconstitutional practices are allowed to flow resulting in
"adult" criminal prosecution and conviction.
"The question boils down simply to whether the legislature could deprive, had
it so intended, a youth of these constitutional rights. This Court believes it could
11 Id., n. 18.
8 Supra note 4.
1 Kent v. United States, - U.S. App. D.C. - , - F.2d - (1965).
4Ibid.
"'See note 34, supra. Constitutional rights are secured to juveniles in New York. N.Y.
Family Court Act, Art. 7 §711 et seq. See Kemble, Procedural Rights of Juvenile Offenders
In New York, 19 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REv. 167 (1964).
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not .... only by amendment may Congress depart from the Federal Constitu-
tion .... Yet by some sort of rationalization, under the guise of protective meas-
ures, we have reached a point where rights once held by a juvenile are no longer
his."42
I In re Poff, supra note 33, at 226.
Federal Procedure-Medical Discovery Provisions of Rule 35 of Fed. R. Civ.
P. Applied to Defendants-Schagenhauf v. Holder, 379 US 104 (1964).
A GREYHOUND BUS, DRIVEN by the petitioner, was involved in a rear-end collision with
a tractor trailer. One of the bus passengers brought suit in the district court based
upon diversity of citizenship for personal injuries against the Greyhound Corpora-
tion, owner of the bus; petitioner Robert L. Schlagenhauf, the bus driver; Contract
Carriers, Inc., owner of the tractor; the driver of the tractor; and the National Lead
Company, owner of the trailer. Greyhound cross-claimed against Contract and Na-
tional for damage to its bus. In answering this cross-claim, Contract denied its negli-
gence and asserted that petitioner Schlagenhauf's negligence "proximately caused and
contributed to" Greyhound's damage and also that Schlagenhauf was not "mentally or
physically capable" of driving a bus at the time of the accident. Contract and National
then jointly petitioned the court for an order, pursuant to Rule 35 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,' directing the petitioner to submit to four mental and phys-
ical examinations, citing as reasons for such request that 1) he was previously in-
volved in a similiar type accident; 2) that the rear lights of the tractor trailer were
visible for a distance of 3/4 to 1/2 mile; and, 3) that the petitioner saw red lights ahead
of him for a period of ten to fifteen seconds prior to the impact and yet did not re-
duce his speed or alter his course. National filed a cross-claim of its own against Grey-
hound and Schlagehauf for damage to its trailer, alleging that the petitioner's vision
and eyes were "impaired and deficient". The district court, without a hearing, ordered
Schlagenhauf to submit to a total of nine examinations by specialists in the fields of
internal medicine, ophthalmology, neurology, and psychiatry,2 despite the fact that
1 Rule 35 provides in part that " (i)n any action in which the physical or mental condition
of a party is in controversy, the court ... may order him to submit to a physical or mental
examination.... The order may be made only on a motion for good cause shown....
(Emphasis added)
2The court has the power to order more than one examination to obtain the full truth
concerning the matter in controversy. Ishler v. Cook, 299 F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1962).
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the petition clearly requested only four examinations.3 Schlagenhauf petitioned the
7th Circuit for a writ of mandamus 4 to have the examination set aside on the ground
that he was not a party to the action, and that, therefore, the judge was without power
to order him to submit to the examinations. 5 The Court refused to grant mandamus.6
In vacating the 7th Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court held that a district court has
the power to order a defendant to submit to a physical and mental examination, but
that the power should not have been exercised in this case because Contract and Na-
tional did not adequately show that the petitioner's mental and physical condition
was "in controversy" or that there was "good cause" for the examination, as required
by Rule 35. Schlagenhauf v. Holder.7
This is the first reported decision in the federal courts in which a district judge has
ordered a defendant in a negligence action to submit to mental and physical examina-
tions. (Emphasis added.) Prior to this decision, Rule 35 had been most frequently ap-
plied to situations in which the plaintiff was the party to be examined, the purpose
being to ascertain the extent of his injuries. Such was the situation discussed in Sib-
bach v. Wilson & Co., 8 which sustained the constitutionality of Rule 35 and held that
it constituted the lawful authority necessary for the court to order a physical or men-
tal examination. Schlagenhauf contended that Sibbach concerned itself solely with
the applicability of the Rule to a plaintiff and that it would be an unconstitutional in-
vasion of privacy to extend it to a defendant. He reasoned that under Sibbach, a
plaintiff who seeks redress for injuries "waives" his right to claim the inviolability of
his person, and, consequently, as he is a defendant and not a plaintiff, the Rule as
construed should not be applied to him, since he has not voluntarily "waived" any
rights. The Court, however, held that Sibbach was not decided on any "waiver" the-
ory and that there was no adequate basis for not extending it to defendants. More-
over, the Rule itself does not refer to any "waiver" theory-it simply refers to the
examination of a "party". Any normal reading of the term "party" would include
both a defendant and a plaintiff because the term in civil litigation includes both.
The district court was correct when it held that the Rule applied to Schlagenhauf,
a defendant. The Court of Appeals gave an undue restrictive interpretation to the
term, however, when it held that he became a "party" to the action only after he was
named in National's cross-claim. It was not necessary that Schlagenhauf be an oppos-
ing party to Contract and National for the Rule to be applied against him. He was
subject to the Rule the instant he was named in the complaint.
Today, because of the holding in the principal case, any party, plaintiff or defend-
ant, can request an examination order for any other party, provided that the mental
or physical condition of that party is "in controversy" and that "good cause" is shown
for each requested examination. The Court held that the district court abused its
8 After the 7th Circuit denied mandamus, the number of examinations was reduced to
four.
'28 U.S.C. §1651 (a) (1958).
See Fong Sik Leung v. Dulles, 226 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1955).
8 Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 321 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1963).
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
8312 U.S. 1 (1941).
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discretion in ordering Schlagenhauf to submit to the examinations as neither of these
two requirements had been fulfilled. The language of Rule 35 is permissive in that the
order is not granted as a matter of right 9 but is left to the sound discretion of the court
to determine whether these two requirements have been satisfied. 10 The importance
of these two requirements is shown by the fact that the "in controversy" requirement
is not found in any of the other discovery devices, and only in Rule 3411 is there a
"good cause" requirement. 12 These requirements would be meaningless if the petition
for examination could be sufficiently supported by a mere claim of relevancy. The
relevancy standard, which is already imposed by Rule 26 (b)13 is very easily met be-
cause of the liberal treatment accorded to it today.14 If this was the standard intended
to be imposed, there would have been no need to add to Rule 35 the heavier burden
of showing that the matter is "in controversy" and that "good cause" exists. The addi-
tion of these two requirements indicates that more is needed under Rule 35 than
under the other discovery rules. Consequently, it is necessary to demonstrate affirma-
tively the probability that the physical and mental condition is relevant and proxi-
mate in point of time to the underlying issues of the litigation, that such a condition
is in controversy, that there is good cause to believe that a physical or mental examina-
tion would best serve to promote the ascertainment of truth, and that other means of
discovery or proof are less satisfactory, considering the law's solicitude for a party's
privacy.15 Because of the "sacredness"' 16 of the human body, the possibility of alterna-
tive proof available must be balanced against the burden on the party to be exam-
ined and the need for discovery.
These requirements cannot be met by mere conclusory allegations of the pleadings,
but require a showing that each condition to which the examination is ordered is
really and genuinely "in controversy" and that "good cause" exists for each particular
examination requested. In the principal case, the only allegations found in the plead-
ings were that the petitioner "was not mentally or physically" capable of operating the
bus and that his eyes and vision were "impaired and deficient". There was nothing
in the pleadings to afford a belief that he was suffering from any mental or neurologi-
cal illness warranting wide ranging psychiatric or neurological examinations. Also,
there was nothing stated to justify the broad internal medicine examination. The
Court stated though, that had a visual examination been the only one ordered, it
would have been hesitant to set it aside. Simply because the petitioner was involved
in an accident and a general charge of negligence was lodged, the district court should
not have ordered the examination. Mental and physical examinations are to be or-
0 Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1952).
10 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Puerto Rico v. Nigron Torres, 255 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1958).
" Rule 34 provides for the "discovery and production of documents and things for
inspection, copying, or photographing."
'Schlagenhauf v. Holder, supra note 7, at 117.
"Rule 26 (b) provides in part that ". . .the deponent may be examined regarding any
matter . . . which is relevant to the subject matter involved ... "
"National Bondholders Corp v. Mc Clintic, 99 F.2d 595 (4th Cir. 1938).
'8 Schlagenhauf v. Holder, supra note 6, at 50.
"8 Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
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dered only upon a discriminating application by the district judge of the limitations
prescribed by the Rule.17
Justices Black and Clark concurred with the Court in holding that the Rule is ap-
plicable to a defendant but dissented from the holding that no examination at all
was justified by the record. They felt that in this type of collision case the petitioner's
health and vision were sufficient bases for an order under the Rule, but agreed that
the order in the principal case was broader than required.
Mr. Justice Douglas joined the majority in reversing the judgment but, on re-
mand, would deny all relief asked under the Rule, reasoning that in a negligence suit,
the defendant's mental and physical condition are not immediately and directly in
controversy, the issue being whether he was negligent or not. He recommended that
the problem be referred to the Civil Rules Committee of the Judicial Conference to
establish proper guidelines to protect the rights of defendants.
Schlagenhauf validly extended the medical discovery provisions of Rule 35 to de-
fendants. In doing so the Court, of necessity, enunciated rigid standards which must
be met before the order for the examination may be given. It is now incumbent upon
the lower courts to require strict adherence to this standard so that the constitutional
rights of defendants are not abridged.
17 Schlagenhauf v. Holder, supra note 7, at 121.
Right of Privacy-"Bugged Bedroom"-Potential Projection of Private Con-
versations-Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A. 2d 239 (1964).
If the peeping Tom, the big ear and the electronic
eavesdropper (whether ingenious or ingenuous) have a
place in the hierarchy of social values, it ought not to be at the
expense of a married couple minding their own
business in the seclusion of their bedroom
who have never asked for or by their conduct deserved a
potential projection of their private conversations
and actions to their landlord or to others.'
THUS CHIEF JUsTicE KENISON of the New Hampshire Supreme Court characterized
invasion of privacy as an actionable tort under the common law of that state. Plain-
tiffs were a married couple whose landlord had "bugged" their bedroom with a
" Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A. 2d 239, 242 (N.H. 1964).
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listening and recording device. When defendant moved to dismiss on the ground
that no cause of action had been stated, the lower court transferred to the Supreme
Court for decision on whether an action for invasion of privacy would lie in New
Hampshire. The question presented was one of first instance in that state, as there
was no controlling statute nor previous decision.
It is generally agreed that the concept of the right of privacy, as a personal rather
than property2 or contract3 right, emerged in 1890 from an article by Warren and
Brandeis in the HARVARD LAW REVIEW,4 although Cooley had earlier asserted that
"the right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let
alonel" 5 In The Right to Privacy, Warren and Brandeis used this principle in de-
lineating a personal right: "Gradually the scope of these legal rights broadened; and
now the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life,-the right to be let
alone." 6 This article lies at the heart of the right of privacy. It absorbed and crystal-
ized all that had gone before. The authors stripped "privacy" of the pretense of being
a contract or property right by forcefully advocating that a right to privacy is a right
against the world.
Following the publication of this article, several decisions in the New York lower
courts accepted the principle of the right of privacy.7 But in Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Company,8 the New York Court of Appeals denied the plaintiff a reme-
dy on the grounds that "the so-called 'right of privacy' has not yet found an abiding
place in our jurisprudence. "9 Lack of precedent made recognition of the right diffi-
cult,' 0 as did the majority's fear of a flood of litigation and undue restriction of free-
dom of speech and press. The dissenters argued that the individual had "the absolute
right to be let alone,"" and that lack of precedent in the field should not preclude a
remedy.
Although the highest court of New York had rejected the right of privacy, the view
of the dissenters prevailed within a year. Public opinion and an aroused press12 led
I Prince Albert v. Strange, 1 Mach. & G. 25, 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (1849), aff'd. 2 DeC. & sm.
652, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1849).
1Yovatt v. Winyard, 1 Jac & W. 394, 37 Eng. Rep. 425 (1820); Abernathy v. Hutchinson,
3 L. J. Ch. 209 (1825).
'Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
5 COOLEY, TORTS 34 (2d Ed. 1888).
6 Supra note 4.
I Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., 27 App. N.Y. 402, 18 N. Y. S. 240 (1891); Marke
v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. 290, 26 N. Y. S. 908 (1893); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N. Y. 434, 42 N. E. 22
(1895).
t 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902). Plaintiff brought suit when defendant company used
her picture in its flour advertisements without her consent.
9 Id. at 447.
10 In England, lack of precedent has resulted in a refusal to recognize the right of privacy.
No right of action was granted in the lead case of Corelli v. Wall, 22 T. L. R. 532 (Ch. 1906).
An excellent discussion of the English view may be found in Brittan, The Right of Privacy
in England and the United States, 37 TULANE L. REV. 235 (1963).
"Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Company, supra note 8, at 449.
"Particularly an editorial in the New York Times on August 23, 1902. This editorial
provoked a law review article, The Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM L. REV. 437 (1902) by Judge
Denis O'Brien, one of the majority in Roberson, in which he defended his position and cas-
tigated the press.
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the New York legislature to enact the first privacy statute. 13 It granted an individual
the right to prevent an incursion upon his privacy only in the area of "commercial
invasion", such as an unauthorized use of name or photograph.
In 1905, in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.,14 the Supreme Court of
Georgia handed down a decision that upheld the right of privacy as a common law
right. As in Roberson, the plaintiff's picture had been used in defendant's adver-
tisement without his consent. Even in the absence of statute or prior decisions plain-
tiff was not without a remedy. The court decided that the case was new only in
instance, not in principle. "The entire absence for a long period of time of a prece-
dent for an asserted right is not conclusive evidence"'15 that the right does not exist.
The Georgia court in conclusion stated that "we venture to predict that the day
will come that the American bar will marvel that a contrary view was ever entertained
by judges of eminence and ability .... "16
Pavesich set the precedent in the common law; it is the leading case in the privacy
field. Since then, most jurisdictions have recognized it in one form or another,'7
three states besides New York have enacted statutes,' 8 and only four jurisdictions
have expressly rejected it.19 It is now included in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTs. 2 0
Numerous treatises, articles, notes and books have offered varying views on the sub-
ject.2' Professor Prosser 22 views the right of privacy not as one tort, "but as a com-
plex of four . . .which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have
almost nothing in common except that each represents an interference with the
right of the plaintiff 'to be let alone'." 23 The four invasions of privacy include: (1)
intrusion; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) false light in the public eye;
(4) appropriation. The fourth type of invasion has received most attention. Due
to the Roberson decision, the New York statute and the Pavesich case, more recog-
nition has been gained for the tort of appropriation than for the related torts.
The first type of invasion includes not merely a physical invasion, 24 but peeping, 25
U3 N. Y. SEss. LAWS 1903, ch. 132 Sec. 1-2, amend. 1921, N. Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW Sec. 50-31.
Constitutionality upheld in Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchison Co., 193 N. Y. 223, 85 N. E. 1097
(1908); Aff'd. 220 U. S. 502 (1911).
" 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1905).
aId. at 50 S. E. 69.
16 1d. at 81.
a'Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee and West Virgina.
B Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia.
as Rhode Island, Nebraska, Texas and Wisconsin.
20 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §867.
2For example: Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237 (1932); Kacedan, The
Right of Privacy, 12 B. U. L. REv. 353 (1932); Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 MICH. L. REV.
526 (1941); Yankwich, The Right of Privacy, 27 NOTRE DAME LAW. 499 (1952); Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960); Note, Criminations of Peeping Toms and Other Men
of Vision, 5 ARK. L. REV. 388 (1951); ZELEMEYER, INVASION OF PRIVACY (1959).
PROSSER, TORTS, 829-51 (3d Ed. 1964).
Id. at 832.
" Ford Motor Co. v. Williams, 108 Ga. App. 21, 132 S. E. 2d 206 (1963).
2Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, Inc. 88 So. 2d. 716 (La. App. 1956).
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eavesdropping by wiretapping2 and use of microphones to overhear private con-
versations.27 As Warren and Brandeis foresaw, ". . . numerous mechanical devices
threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be
proclaimed from the house-tops.' "28 Now the field of intrusion upon the plaintiff's
physical and mental solitude or seclusion has gained primary importance due to the
decision in the instant case. Hamberger decides that not only is the listening to an-
other's conversation or watching his actions recognized as intrusion, but the mere
"potential projection of their private conversations and actions" 29 is an injury to
personality. The significance of this case is based upon the fact that there was no
real publication to the world; rather it was an intrusion by one man who attempted
to overhear conversations by means of a mechanical system he had installed. The
plaintiffs were granted a remedy for such injury to personality, since their bedroom
was the locus of this hidden microphone.
This recognition affords a greater degree of protection in securing "the mental
peace and comfort of the individual",3 0 to which publicity "may produce suffering
more acute than that produced by a mere bodily injury."3' 1 This is a far cry from
the dire prediction made less than thirty years ago by Professor Bohlen that
there seems little real hope that these few sporadic exhibitions of judicial indig-
nation will lead to a much needed recognition of a right in our citizens not to
have their purely private life exposed to the gaze of a public which has no
concern with it save that of morbid curiosity. 2
We have become aware of the pernicious proliferation of intrusions upon one's
privacy. In holding that a man's home is his castle and cannot be invaded, the New
Hampshire court not only continues the best traditions of Anglo-American jurispru-
dence, but gives further recognition to an individual's right to solitude. "Certainly,
no right deserves greater protection, for, as Emerson well said, 'solitude, the safe-
guard of mediocity, is to genius the stern friend.' "33
'6 La Crone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 114 Ohio App. 299, 182 N. E. 2d 15 (1961.)
2 Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S. E. 2d 564 (1958)
1 Supra note 4, at 195.
2Supra note 1, at 242.
'0 III POUND, JURISPRUDENcE 58 (1959).
81 Ibid.
2Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L REV. 725, 732 (1937).
"Ezer, Intrusion on Solitude; Herein of Civil Rights and Civil Wrongs, 21 LAW IN
TRANSITION 63, 75 (1961).
1965] Case Notes 285
Secured Transactions-Priorities-UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-310-
Corbin Deposit Bank v. King, 384 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964).
FLOYD FOREMAN, OWNER OF A MOTOR VEHICLE, delivered a valid security agreement
on it to the Corbin Deposit Bank. The bank perfected the security interest1 by re-
cording the agreement in compliance with Kentucky law.2 While Foreman's obliga-
tion to the bank was in full force and unpaid, he engaged King, an automobile me-
chanic,8 to make repairs and furnish material for the vehicle.4 Foreman did not pay
for the repairs and incident material, and subsequently, defaulted in payment on
the security agreement. The bank then obtained possession of the motor vehicle by
legal process. 5 The bank sold the vehicle,6 and repairman King commenced this
action against the bank contending that his statutory mechanic's lien took priority
over the bank's perfected security interest, and that the proceeds of the sale inured
to him. The bank maintained the priority of its perfected security interest by alleg-
ing (1) that, in similar circumstances, Kentucky courts have adhered to the rule
allowing priority to a properly recorded chattel mortgage,7 (2) that a contrary de-
cision would contravene established public policy, 8 and (3) that statutory provisions
of Kentucky reflect that the mechanic's lien is to yield to the security interest.9
The lower court placed priority in the statutory repairman's lien. On appeal, the
court of appeals held: despite the line of cases which have afforded priority to chattel
mortgages in similar circumstances, the Uniform Commercial Code, as it deals with
I The court's decision says no more than that the recorded agreement between Foreman
and the Corbin Deposit Bank was a financing statement. The court does not name the
transaction, but that fact is of little significance when one realizes that prior to the Uniform
Commercial Code there were vast areas of modern chattel transactions for which Kentucky
had provided no statutory framework. Transactions such as conditional sales were subject
generally to the law applicable to chattel mortgages. See, Munz v. National Bond & Inv. Co.,
243 Ky. 293, 47 S.W.2d 1055 (1932); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Sharp Motor Sales
Co., 233 Ky. 240, 25 S.W.2d 405 (1930).
2 Ky. REV. STAT. ch. 355, §9-302 (1960).
3KY. REv. STAT. ch. 376, §270 provides that persons engaged in the business of repairing
or furnishing accessories for motor vehicles shall have a lien on the vehicle. The statutory
provision does not expressly state whether the lien takes priority over other liens or security
interests.
' King did not know of the recorded financing statement, but no significance can be ascribed
to that fact, since its proper filing placed King on constructive notice thereof. KY. REV. STAT.
ch. 355, §9-303 (1960). Kentucky requires only local filing with the County Clerk.
6 The vehicle was removed from the possession of King by the sheriff acting under proper
court order.
6 Pursuant to Ky. REv. STAT. ch. 355, §9-504 (1960), the secured party has the right to dis-
pose of the collateral after default.
Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Netter, 253 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952), provided that
a lien created by a recorded mortgage is superior to a subsequent statutory lien for labor
and accessories. The court's determination here was under Ky. REV. STAT. ch. 376, §270
which grants a lien to repairmen of automobiles, but the statutory provision does not make
such lien subordinate to a mortgage; that development came solely by decisional law.
' The language of Indiana Truck Corp. of Ky. v. Hurry Up Broadway Co., 222 Ky. 521, 1
S.W.2d 990 (1928) observed that the great importance of financing purchase of motor
vehicles demanded protection of the lien to the financier.
0 By the terms of Ky. REV. STAT. ch. 376, §450 the lien provided for in Ky. REv. STAT. ch.
376, §440 (a lien on equipment, machinery, and motors for work and supplies) shall "not
take precedence over a mortgage or bona fide sale and delivery for value without notice...."
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the question of priorities, is treating the matter of security interests-not mortgages,
and places priority in the mechanic's lien rather than the perfected security interest.1 0
The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-310 provides that
When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes services or
materials with respect to goods subject to a security interest, a lien upon goods in
the possession of such person given by statute or rule of law for such material or
services takes priority over a perfected security interest unless the lien is statutory
and the statute expressly provides otherwise.1'
Comment 2 states that
. . . This Section . . . makes the lien for services or materials prior in all cases
where they are furnished in the ordinary course of the lienor's business .... Some
of the statutes creating such liens expressly make the lien subordinate to a prior
security interest. This Section does not repeal such statutory provisions. If the
statute creating the lien is silent, even though it has been construed by decision
to make the lien subordinate to the security interest, this Section provides a
rule of interpretation that the lien should take priority over the security interest.
(Emphasis added.)
Article 9 of the Code governs the entire field of chattel security interest. It is de-
signed to replace all the archaic law of chattel mortgages, conditional sales, bailment
leases, trust receipts, and the like. 12 In the past, matters such as the manner by
which the security interest was created, the manner by which the security interest was
perfected against third parties, and the manner by which the security interest was
foreclosed was handled haphazardly, because the security law was divided into sepa-
rate bodies having their own rules and functions. Article 9 of the Code is designed to
end this fragmentation. It completely repeals these old laws and replaces them with
a single kind of security which it calls a "secured transaction."
The mechanic's lien is excluded from Article 9 because it is not created consensu-
ally but through the operation of positive law. In most states, liens are given to sup-
pliers of many kinds of services and materials, and the nature of these liens is largely
dependent upon local considerations which the Code does not attempt to displace.18
Section 9-310, however, does state rules for determining the priority between the
mechanic's lien and the consensual security interests covered by Article 9.
Section 9-310 of the Code declares the priority of the lien of persons furnishing
services or material. Whether such a lien is based upon decision or statute law, §9-310
gives it priority over a pre-existing security interest in the goods, except if the statute
expressly provides otherwise.
10 Corbin Deposit Bank v. King, 384 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964).
11 Ky. REV. STAT. ch. 355, §9-310 (1960).
"The aim of this Article is to provide a simple and unified structure within which the
immense variety of present-day secured financing transactions can go forward with less cost
and greater certainty." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-101.
13 2 HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE To THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 572 (1964).
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Prior to legislative determination, courts were presented with the conflicting choice
between the rule that, other things being equal, liens first in time are entitled to
prior satisfaction, or the preference which the law has always had for the claims of
those offering ordinary and necessary services to the general public without an oppor-
tunity to investigate in advance the responsibility of their customer.
Courts which gave priority to the security interest prior in time reasoned that the
secured party, who had taken proper steps to protect his interest and who had not
expressly or impliedly authorized performance of the services, was deserving of prior
satisfaction because of the importance of chattel financing and because he was the
first to have an interest in the chattel. 14
The courts which chose to protect the mechanic's lien were unwilling to promul-
gate a clear-cut rule granting that preference as a matter of public policy, choosing
rather to rely upon an inference of authority from the secured party to the debtor,
permitting the latter to subject the li n property to a subsequent repairman's lien.15
Eventually, the legislatures of th. various jurisdictions intervened to settle the
matter by statute, providing either hat a properly recorded security interest takes
priority over all subsequent liens, oi, conversely, that the mechanic's lien is entitled
to priority despite the encumbrance of a security interest prior in time.16
The Code silences all the decisional law and gives cognizance only to those statutes
which expressly provide subordination of the mechanic's lien to the security interest.
If there is no statute, or if the statute is silent as to priorities, the mechanic's lien
takes priority.
The Kentucky court, in the instant case, used this argument to refute the bank's two
initial contentions.1 7 The two contentions alleging priority for the security interest
were based upon decisional law affecting a silent statute, and decisional law forming
public policy. The court needed only to point to the official comment to § 9-310 of
the Code; it states that "if the statute creating the lien is silent, even though it has
been construed by decision to make the lien subordinate to the security interest, this
Section [9-310] provides a rule of interpretation that the lien should take priority
over the security interest."
The court had difficulty in refuting the bank's third contention.18 It was argued
that Ky. REV. STAT. ch. 376, § 440 grants a lien to repairman and that Ky. REV. STAT.
ch. 376, § 450, in referring to that lien, states that it shall "not take precedence over
a mortgage." The court's only answer is that "the Uniform Commercial Code, and
particularly Ky. REV. STAT. ch. 355, § 9-310 as it deals with the question of priorities,
is treating the matter of security interests-not mortgages."' 9 The court attempts to
", Chief Justice John Marshall in Rankin v. Scott, 12 Wheat. 177. 6 L.Ed. 592 (1827) stated
that it is a universal principle that a prior lien entitles such claimant to prior satisfaction
out of the security. See also, Sloat v. Mid-West Fin. Corp., 219 Mich. 577, 189 N.W. 52 (1922);
Rothweiler v. Winton Motor Car Co., 92 Wash. 215. 158 Pac. 737 (1916).
15A number of cases have found consent implied on various theories, e.g., possession by
the debtor. See, Etchen v. Dennis & Son Garage, 104 Kan. 241, 178 Pac. 408 (1919); Guaranty
Security Corp. v. Brophy, 243 Mass. 597, 137 N.E. 751 (1923).
'5Annot., 36 A.L.R. 2d 229 (1954).
17 Supra notes 8 and 9.
'Is Supra note 10.
'5384 S.W.2d 302 at 304.
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distinguish between security interests, as the Code defines them, and mortgages, so
that it can grant priority to the mechanic.
The Code defines "security interest" as an "interest in personal property or fixtures
which secures payment or performance of an obligation .... The term also includes
any interest of a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, or contract rights which is subject
to Article 9 .. "20 This broad definition would encompass any chattel transaction
modern law has known.
Commentators on the Code would seem to disagree with the Kentucky court. Most
writers have stated that terms such as "mortgage," "conditional sale," and others
of similar import were encumbered by meanings and constructions derived from
pre-Code concepts, and in order to avoid the limitations and restrictions of the older
concepts the draftsmen of Article 9 chose the term "security interest" to express the
new concept.21 No commentator on the Code would agree with the Kentucky court
in distinguishing between the terms.
The court might have avoided this embarrassing situation had it examined the
bank's third argument. It was argued that the lien provided for in KY. REv. STAT. ch.
376, §440 relates to repairs on automobiles. Actually, the section does not speak of
automobiles or motor vehicles as such.22 It seems to refer more to machinery or equip-
ment that one would find in an industrial plant.
The effect of this decision could be catastrophic to the future of the Code in Ken-
tucky if courts decide to continue to distinguish between various chattel transactions
and the Code's definition of "security interest." The Code's terms were intended to
be broad enough to include all prior chattel transactions, and to begin to create
uniformity in secured transactions.
Certainly the Code silences Kentucky's prior decisional law; the problem arises as
to the remaining chattel laws on the Kentucky statutes. When Kentucky adopted the
Code in 1960 it failed to repeal its old chattel security laws.23 Kentucky found itself
with both the Code and a series of vestigial security statutes on its books. In 1961, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals reviewed this situation and found that the Code is suffi-
ciently specific to repeal by implication the prior Kentucky chattel mortgage laws.2 4
Thereafter, though various chattel laws were stricken from the Kentucky statutes,
Ky. REV. STAT. ch. 376, § 440 was not.
It is evident that the court wished to follow the Code's preference for mechanic
liens, but distinguishing between security interests and mortgages was the difficult
way to accomplish this, and could, in the future, undermine the Code in Kentucky.
'*UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §1-201 (37).
SPIVACK, SECURED TRANSACTIONS 17 (1963).
KY. REV. STAT. ch. 376, §440 provides any person engaged in the business of selling, re-
pairing, or furnishing accessories, or supplies for any kind of equipment or machinery, in-
cluding motors, shall have a lien on the equipment, machine, machinery, or motor, for thc
reasonable or agreed charges for repairs, work done, accessories, parts, and supplies furnished
for the equipment, machine, machinery, or motor until the reasonable or agreed charge
therefor has been paid. Ky. REv. STAT. ch. 376, §450 then states the lien is subordinate to a
mortgage.
1 The official Uniform Commercial Code advocates, in Article 10, the repealing of all
prior chattel laws. Kentucky did not adopt Article 10 in its Code.
2, Lincoln Bank and Trust Co., v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961); 60 MIcu.
L. REV. 242 (1961-62).
[Vol. XIV
Case Notes
Taxation-Depreciation Computation-Reserve Ratio Test-Rev. Proc. 62-
21 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 418.
THE TAXABLE YEAR 1965 is an important year for business taxpayers. This is a year
in which their taxes would have been increased by as much as 700 million dollars if
the Treasury had not adopted the reserve ratio test-a test that puts important limits
on the amount of depreciation deductions business can take. Equally important, it
raises broad questions of economic and social policy as to whether the best way to
stimulate our economy is through these large tax reductions to the business taxpayer.
It is, of course, no surprise to business that this is the year in which the amount of
deduction it may take for depreciation of its assets is to be subjected to the standards
of the reserve ratio test. Indeed the taxpayers have had three years, since 1962, in
order to use their own computation of depreciable life-subject only to inclusion
within wide categories of the depreciable life useable for broad groups of assets. This
system replaced Bulletin F in 1962-Bulletin F being a very strict system of classify-
ing the depreciable life of many thousands of types of assets on a specific and indi-
vidual basis. Business had long objected to the strict standard of Bulletin F, and so
in 1962 Bulletin F was replaced by a system of broad groupings of assets for depreci-
ation purposes-but subject to the safeguards of the reserve ratio test as a check on
abuse.
However, business no longer need fear the strict limitations for the reserve ratio
test, for, as this note will discuss, the Treasury has just "liberalized" that test on a
broad scale. Except for this liberalization, business' tax bill would have been in-
creased by 700 million dollars in 1965 due to the reserve ratio test.'
The purpose of the 1962 and 1965 changes in the depreciation methods (of which
the reserve ratio test is a counterbalancing part) is to provide a fairer method of
depreciation, or to reduce taxes by increasing depreciation.
Depreciation is an expense of doing business. As such, it is an allowable deduction
in computing income tax.2 Reserve ratio is the relation between depreciation de-
ductions and the original cost. That is to say, if an item cost $1000 and $520 has been
deducted as depreciation, the ratio would be fifty-two percent. The reserve ratio test
is an objective method introduced with the 1962 tax reform to act as a safeguard in
assuring that the 1962 methods for taking depreciation would not be misused. 3
Depreciation has a long and involved history. Prior to 1954, the most common
method was a straight-line depreciation, that is, the original cost (less salvage value)
was deducted in annual installments over the estimated useful life of the asset. 4
1 Treas. Liberalized Depreciation Rules, Press Release, Feb. 18, 1965.
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §167 (a). A taxpayer may deduct from his income a reasonable
allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear, and obsolescence of property used in the trade
of business, or property held by the taxpayer for the production of income. Treas. Reg.
§1.167 (a)-l (1956), as amended, T. D. 6507, 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 91; T.D. 6712, 1964-1 Cum.
Bull. 106.
Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 418.
'Treas. Reg. §167 (b)-1 (a) (1956). Straight-line depreciation is computed as follows: An
asset costing $120,000 has an estimated useful life of five years and a salvage value of $20,000.
The annual rate of depreciation is 100% 5=20%. The annual depreciation equals the
original cost ($120,000) minus salvage value ($20,000) times the rate of depreciation (20%)
or $20,000 per year for the life of the asset.
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Subsequent to 1954, other methods of depreciation were introduced, namely the
declining balance method and the sum of the digits method. 5 Both of these allowed
larger depreciation deductions during the early years of the asset's useful life.
6 In
computing depreciation by the aforementioned methods, the useful life span of
innumerable assets is listed in Bulletin F.7
The 1962 depreciation procedure contains guideline lives to replace Bulletin F.
,That is, instead of an individual rule for each type of assets, a broad set of guidelines
was set up. The guidelines for depreciation apply useful lives to about seventy-five
broad classes of assets, which lives are from thirty percent to forty percent shorter
than those contained in Bulletin F.8 Thus the trend towards increasing annual de-
preciation deductions is accomplished by shortening the useful life of the assets.
Automatic use of the guideline lives, as published in 1962, allows a three year tran-
sitional period during which no questions are asked. The taxable year of 1965 is a
year of reckoning for most taxpayers who elected to use the shorter guideline lives.
Now the taxpayers must show that their equipment replacement is consistent with
the guideline life used in computing depreciation. 9
The objective standard for determining the appropriateness of the depreciation is
the reserve ratio test. The reserve ratio is the ratio of the total depreciation deduc-
tions already taken (depreciation reserve) to the original cost.10 The test requires
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §167 (b), (2), (3). These methods are applicable only to tangible
property, newly in use, with a useful life of more than three years. Rev. Rul. 59-389, 1959-2
Cum. Bull. 89.
6 Larger depreciation during the early years is shown by the following examples: (a) The
declining balance method is computed without adjustment for salvage value. The rate
of depreciation may be as high as 200% of the straight-line rate. The annual depreciation
equals the original cost ($120,000) times twice the rate used in straight-line depreciation
(40%), or $48,000, in the first year of depreciation. The next year the amount of annual
depreciation is subtracted from the original cost ($120,000-$48,000=$72,000) and the
rate (40%) then applied, equaling a depreciation allowance of $28,800. The amount of
depreciation for each year is subtracted from the original cost of the property, so that the
uniform depreciation rate is applied to a smaller balance each year. While salvage value
is not taken into account in determining the annual allowance, an asset may not be depreciat-
ed below a reasonable salvage value. Treas. Reg. §1.67 (b)-2. (B) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6712,
1964-1 Cum. Bull. 106. The sum of the digits method is computed by applying changing
fractions to the cost minus the estimated salvage value. The rate for any year is a fraction
whose denominator is the sum of the numbers which represent the estimated useful life of
the asset. If the useful life is 5 years, the denominator of the fraction is 15 (1+2+3+4+5).
The numerator of the fraction changes each year to a number which corresponds to the re-
maining useful life of the asset. Therefore, the depreciation allowance for the first year on
an asset costing $120,000 and having a salvage value of $20,000 is 5/15 of $100,000, or
$33,333; the second year, 4/15 of $100,000, or $26,667; the third year, 3/15 of $100,000 or
$20,000; the fourth year, 2/15 of $100,000, or $13,333; and the fifth year, 1/15 of $100,000,
ox $6,667. Treas. Reg. §1.167 (b)-3 (1956).
1 U.S. Bureau of Internal Revenue, Dept. of the Treasury, Bull. F, "Income Tax Deprecia-
tion and Obsolescence-Estimated Useful Lives and Depreciation Rates," Part II (rev. ed.
1942). Useful life of depreciable property is measured by the use in a taxpayer's business,
not by the full abstract economic life of the asset in any business. Massey Motors, Inc. v.
U.S., 365 U.S. 92, 99 (1960); Hertz Corp. v. U.S., 364 U.S. 122, 124 (1960).
8 Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 418 contains depreciation tables, grouping various
classes of equipment and showing guideline lives for each of these broad classes.
9Int. Rev. Pub. 456, July 1962; 652 CCH 1965 Stand. Fed. Tax Reg. #1762-10.
10 For example, if the taxpayer has farm equipment (a guideline class of assets) which cost
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the taxpayer's actual reserve ratio to be compared with the standard range of ratios
contained in the Reserve Ratio Table.'1 The test will be met if the taxpayer's reserve
ratio does not exceed the upper limits of the acceptable range of reserve ratios. The
Reserve Ratio Table has a built-in margin of tolerance, so that a taxpayer may hold
assets for as much as twenty percent longer than the useful life claimed for tax de-
preciation and still meet the reserve ratio test.' 2
The taxpayer's use of guideline lives may be questioned in the fourth year of use
-1965 for most taxpayers-only if the reserve ratio test is failed, or if application of
the test indicates that the taxpayer is not moving toward consistent replacement
practice.' 3 A consistent replacement pattern is demonstrated if the difference be-
tween the taxpayer's reserve ratio and the standard rate of the Reserve Ratio Table
is lower in 1965 than in any one of the three previous years.
By 1964, it became apparent that many businesses would not be able to meet the
reserve ratio test. 4 One reason for this failure is that many businesses purchased a
large part of their equipment at one time. Thus equipment costs are bunched and
the rate of growth is uneven, causing deductions exceeding the reserve ratio test be-
cause the Reserve Ratio Table is based on an even rate of growth. Consequently,
these taxpayers are allowed to compute a reserve ratio standard tailored to individual
circumstances (guideline form).15
A second reason for failure to meet the reserve ratio test is that the three year
transitional period is too short a time for industry to reclassify assets according to
the seventy-five broad classes outlined in the 1962 depreciation procedure and re-
him $10,000, on which he has taken depreciation in the amount of $5,200, his reserve ratio
is $5200/$10,000, or 52%.
U To read the Reserve Ratio Table, the taxpayer must know: (1) the rate of growth of the
guideline class of assets; (2) the class life to be tested. For example, if an item cost $1,000
and $520 has been deducted as depreciation, and assuming that the cost of the assets one
replacement cycle earlier was $8,000, the rate of growth is computed by the ratio of the
assets at the close of the current year ($10,000) to the assets at the close of the previous
replacement cycle ($8,000), or 1.25. The rate of growth is 2% (read from the Rate of Growth
Conversion Table). The class life to be tested is the suggested guideline life for farm equip-
ment-10 years. Comparing the taxpayer's reserve ratio (52%) with the range selected from
the Reserve Ratio Table, appropriate to straight line depreciation, (44%-56%), the taxpayer
has demonstrated his compliance with the reserve ratio test. 652 CCH 1965 Stand. Fed. Tax
Reg. #1713A.11.
Int. Rev. Pub. No. 456, July 1962.
15 Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 418, Part II, §5.
"(a) Special Survey of Corporate Guideline Depreciation and the Investment Credit, De-
partment of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, published in an article by Laurence
Budge, "New Depreciation Guidelines and the Investment Credit, Effect on 1962 Corporate
Profits and Taxes," Survey of Current Business, July 1963. (b) National Industrial Conference
Board Survey of Depreciation Practices.
15The guideline form provides each taxpayer with an individually tailored upper limit
against which he can measure his actual reserve ratio. The guideline form may be used as a
substitute for the Reserve Ratio Table, at the annual election of the taxpayer. To use the
guideline form, the taxpayer must know: (1) the amount of equipment in the guideline class
that was acquired in the current year and in each preceding year for a period of the guideline
life plus 20% of the guideline life. The taxpayer's actual reserve ratio is compared with the
reserve ratio limit determined by dividing the total "cost of assets" acquired during the "ex-
tended life" for the guideline class into the total "cumputed reserve" for the period. Treas.
Liberalized Depreciation Rules, Press Release, Feb. 19, 1965.
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adjust long-range plans, concerning retirement and replacement practices, to the
shorter guideline lives. To facilitate this transition the Treasury now considers the
reserve ratio test to be met if the taxpayer's reserve ratio is fifteen percentage points
higher than the upper limit provided in the Reserve Ratio Table. The taxpayer has
a guideline life-a full life cycle-to bring his reserve ratio within the standard range
of the Reserve Ratio Table as published in 1962 (transitional allowance rule).
If the taxpayer still cannot meet the reserve ratio test, even with the benefit of
fifteen additional points and the extended transitional period, the Internal Revenue
Service now will increase the life of the asset by only five to ten percent instead of
the twenty-five percent prescribed in the 1962 depreciation procedure-increasing
the life automatically reduces the annual depreciation deduction (The Minimal
Adjustment Rule).
Treasury studies and the National Industrial Conference Board survey show that
the use of open-end multiple asset accounts16 in conjunction with the straight line or
sum of the digits methods of computing depreciation (which use as a basis for de-
preciation the original cost minus the salvage value) has resulted in exaggerated
depreciation reductions. Consequently, beginning with the fourth year, if the tax-
payer using these methods wishes to use the guideline procedure, the cost of assets
purchased in the fourth and subsequent taxable years must be recorded in the year's
acquisition accounts or in item accounts. If the taxpayer wishes to continue using
the open-end multiple asset account, he must use the declining balance method of
computing depreciation which applies a uniform rate to the unrecovered cost of the
asset, lowering the basis for computing depreciation each year. This accounting re-
straint is mandatory because the open-end multiple asset account used in conjunction
with the declining balance method allows a more realistic depreciation deduction
and discourages the retention of old assets.
The trend towards liberalizing depreciation began with the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 which allowed optional accelerated methods of computing depreci-
ation. The Revenue Act of 1962, in addition to guideline lives and the reserve ratio
test, allowed a seven percent investment credit on tangible depreciable property.17
It also withdrew capital gains treatment from the gain on a sale of certain depreci-
able property to the extent that the depreciation had already been deducted, per-
mitting only the excess of the sales price over the original cost to be treated as
capital gains. 18 This reduced taxpayers' ability to deduct accelerated depreciation
16 An open-end multiple asset account is a single account in which a taxpayer may group
assets regardless of their character or useful life (such as all depreciable property in a
business); assets acquired in the current year and in prior years are recorded in such an
account.
" A credit against income tax is allowed in an amount equal to 7% of investment in tangi-
ble personal property. The credit may offset tax liability in full up to $25,000 and against
25% of tax liability above $25,000. Any unused credit can be carried back 3 years (but not
to a year ending before 1962) and carried forward for 5 years. To qualify for the credit a
taxpayer must reduce the asset's value for depreciation purposes by the amount of the
credit, an adjustment required under Int. Rev. Code, §167 (g) and Treas. Reg. §1.167 (g)-
1 (1956), as amended T.D. 6712, 1964-1 Cum. Bull. 106.
"8 Under INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §1245 (added 1962) the gain on the sale of depreciable
property (but not real property, buildings and their structural components) is ordinary in-
come to the extent that the original cost has been adjusted for depreciation allowed for
periods after 1961. In 1964, P.L. 88-272, §231 (a) added §1250 to the Int. Rev. Code of 1954
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from ordinary income and then convert the ordinary income to capital gain by sale
at capital gain rates.
The liberalizing rules published by the Treasury on February 18, 1965, permit still
larger deductions and greater retained income than permitted by Revenue Pro-
cedure (62-21), by elasticizing the reserve ratio test until it fits almost any depreci-
ation reserve, thereby really ending its effectiveness as a safeguard.
The basic tax philosophy underlying the liberalized depreciation procedure was
outlined by President Kennedy in his first tax message to Congress, in which he said:
"The tax system must be adequate to meet our public needs . . . It must promote
economic stability and stimulate economic growth.... If our goods are to compete
with foreign goods in price and quality, both at home and abroad, we shall need
the most efficient plants and equipment. At the same time, to meet the needs of a
growing population and labor force, and to achieve a rising per capita income and
employment level, we need a high and rising level of both private and public capital
formation."19
Investment incentive is the core of the Kennedy-Johnson tax policy reflecting a
decision to favor high investing, high income groups over low income groups, and
seeking to stimulate consumption only by encouraging investment-a feathering of
the goose that lays the golden egg. An investment incentive tax policy is actually an
indirect subsidy to a particular group of taxpayers. Is our present tax structure ade-
quate to meet the needs of a growing population and labor force and to achieve a
rising per capita income and employment level? Is it worth the price the govern-
ment is paying in loss of revenue and in reduction of the progressive character of
the income tax? Is it no more than a rationalization for particular tax advantages?
It is paradoxical that while on the one hand our government is seeking to bridge
the cleavage between the underprivileged and privileged by the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,20 it is at the same time widening
that cleavage by a tax system which shifts the tax burden from the upper bracket high
investing taxpayer to the general public.
The Treasury reports that in 1962, 27.7 billion dollars of potential revenue re-
mained in the hands of the corporate taxpayer in the form of corporate depreciation
allowance, an increase of 4.1 billion dollars• over that of the previous year. Sixty per-
cent of this increase, or 2.4 billion dollars, was attributable to the use of the 1962
Guideline Procedure. 21
What the corporate taxpayer's gain and the Government tax loss will be, with the
use of the 1965 revised and liberalized form of depreciation procedure remains to
be seen. Whatever the outcome, it is an indisputable fact that the reserve ratio test
plays an important role in a tax structure that assists business in its ever accelerating
modernization policy.
treating all or part of the gain on the sale of depreciable real property held for less than
10 years as ordinary income to the extent of depreciation taken after 1963 exceeds straight
line depreciation.
19 107 Cong. Rec. 6456 (1961).
' Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 78
Stat. 508 (1964).
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